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Introduction 
Economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that change occurs 
through a process of creative destruction.1 Competitors innovate new 
ways of doing things, which ushers in a new world to which competitors 
must adapt, sparking further rounds of innovation and adaptation. The 
law is no less subject to these processes than business, as recent 
developments in shareholder litigation show. 
State corporate law governs the relationship between shareholders 
and boards of directors and confers upon shareholders the right to sue 
directors for breaches of fiduciary duty.2 Most powerful among these,  
†  T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of 
Law. This Article benefited from comments received at the 2018 Leet 
Symposium at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks 
to Joe Grundfest and Anthony Rickey for comments and conversations 
on earlier drafts. For superlative research assistance, thanks to Julian 
Constain (FLS 2020). The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are 
mine alone. 
1. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 82–
83 (2d ed. 1947). 
2. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and 
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 Del. J. Corp. 
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at least historically, is the fiduciary duty cause of action available to 
shareholders when the company they own is merged with or acquired 
by another company.3 In merger litigation, shareholders can sue the 
board of directors for following a flawed sale process4 or for failing to 
disclose adequate information prior to the shareholder vote on the 
transaction.5 For many years, approximately one-third to one-half of all 
merger deals valued over $100 million attracted such claims. Then 
suddenly, in 2009, the proportion of transactions attracting merger 
 
L. 673, 675–76 (2005) (“The central idea of Delaware’s approach to 
corporate law is the social utility of an active, engaged central 
management. That idea is expressed by our statute, which states the 
fundamental principle that the ‘business and affairs of the corporation are 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.’” (quoting Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018))). 
3. Id. at 676. Shareholders can sue their directors for a breach of the duty of 
either care or loyalty. Application of the business judgment rule, however, 
assures that they will typically lose these cases. See Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
Vand. L. Rev. 83, 88–89 (2004) (“The [business judgment rule 
creates] . . . a presumption that the directors or officers ‘of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the 
action was in the best interests of the company.’” (quoting Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812) (Del. 1984)). Mergers and acquisitions cases, 
however, often receive a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. See J. Travis 
Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It 
Means, 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 5, 6 (2013) (discussing Revlon, 
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) 
and how it changed the extent of judicial deference given to the board’s 
decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions). For brevity, I will refer to 
merger and acquisition claims collectively as “merger litigation.” 
4. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Mergers 
involving a controlling shareholder may be reviewed under the exacting 
“entire fairness” standard. Id. at 710–11 (requiring fair dealing and fair 
price in non-arm’s length transactions). However, a board’s adoption of 
procedural protections, such as special committees and majority of the 
minority vote requirements, may be deployed in such transactions to shift 
the standard to the deferential business judgment rule. Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). Meanwhile, third-party 
mergers may be reviewed under the standard of “enhanced scrutiny.” 
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986). 
However, in a claim for damages, an “uncoerced, informed stockholder 
vote” will shift the standard to the business judgment rule. Corwin v. 
KKR Fin. Holdings, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). Furthermore, a 
claim for injunctive relief will likely not succeed in the absence of an 
intervening bidder. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ 
and Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1066–67 (Del. 2014). 
5. See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (“[D]irectors of 
Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and 
fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks 
shareholder action.”). 
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litigation jumped from about half to approximately 85 percent.6 The 
higher number became the new normal. In each year from 2009 until 
2016, somewhere between 85 and 95 percent of all deals attracted 
litigation.7 
What happened in 2009 that generated this spike in merger 
litigation? A respected practitioner once explained it to me as a function 
of a policy change at public relations firms. According to him, in 2009 
the two top public relations firms began accepting press releases from 
law firms announcing “investigations” of board conduct in connection 
with corporate transactions. Once a deal was announced, plaintiffs’ 
firms could immediately announce an investigation of the board. 
Inevitably these announcements linked to the plaintiffs’ website and 
suggested that anyone holding stock in the target company contact the 
law firm for further information on the investigation. Packaged as press 
releases, these announcements were then picked up by websites, such 
as Yahoo Finance. As a result, shareholders looking up news of a merger 
announcement or simply tracking their investments would find, on the 
same web page, the announcement of an investigation into board 
misconduct in connection with the transaction. The announcements 
were, of course, a veiled form of attorney advertising for those lawyers 
specializing in disclosure-based claims (the “disclosure bar”).8 Anyone  
6. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The 
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 465, 
475 (2015). 
7. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 
2015, at 2 (Berkeley Ctr. for L., Bus. & Econ., Working Paper, 2017), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/S662-S3BH] (providing 
empirical evidence of litigation activity and outcomes).  
8. On the division of the plaintiffs’ bar into two on the basis of those who 
bring disclosure-based claims and those who do not, see Joel Edan 
Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of 
Disclosure Settlements, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 877, 904–05 (2016). In 
Friedlander’s words: 
The widespread availability of disclosure settlements led to the 
creation of a two-tier stockholder-plaintiff bar with very different 
approaches to litigating the same type of case. One tier of firms 
has adopted a business model of entering into disclosure 
settlements and thereby collecting risk-free fee awards near the 
outset of a case. These firms released Revlon claims after a 
purported investigation of their viability, even though they had 
no demonstrated track record of pursuing Revlon claims for 
significant monetary relief. Another tier of firms did not present 
disclosure settlements to the Court of Chancery, and instead 
litigated preliminary injunction motions and sought damages on 
Revlon claims. In an unknown number of cases, firms in the 
disclosure settlement bar released valuable Revlon claims. 
 Id. at 882; see also Sean J. Griffith & Anthony Rickey, Who Collects the 
Deal Tax, Where, and What Delaware Can Do About It, in Research 
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who contacted the law firm was a potential plaintiff who might be 
willing to let the firm file a suit in their name against the target 
company. Thus, announcing the “investigation” as a press release 
became the key to finding a plaintiff. The policy change at the public 
relations firms enabled the disclosure bar to find a shareholder in, and 
thus to file a claim against, every deal. 
That story may be apocryphal. But at its core is a truth about 
innovation. It begins with an outside shock that leads to adaptation 
and, in the view of many, destruction.9 Delaware responded to the 
development with a 2016 decision of the Court of Chancery, In re 
Trulia,10 which made disclosure-based merger claims harder to settle.11  
Handbook On Representative Shareholder Litigation 140 (Sean 
Griffith et al. ed., 2018) (noting that the distinction between the disclosure 
bar and the non-disclosure bar is sometimes porous). 
9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise and 
Fall and Future 90 (2015) (noting that in the context of merger class 
actions, “incentives to sue have become excessive, and litigation is growing 
out of control, like algae in a petri dish”); see also Stephen Bainbridge, 
Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 851, 
852 (2016) (contending that merger litigation is a “problem [that] has 
reached crisis proportions”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, 
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak 
Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 19, 27 (2016) (noting that 
“litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is now of 
epidemic proportions”); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal 
for Reform, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557, 558–59 (2015) (noting that “[d]eal 
litigation is pervasive in the United States” and providing statistics); 
Friedlander, supra note 8, at 883 (“The institutionalization of routine 
disclosure settlements parodied the procedures for adjudicating claims of 
breach of fiduciary duty.”); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate 
Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on 
Fees, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2015) (“The defects of shareholder litigation 
have long been known.”); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The 
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 Ohio 
St. L.J. 829, 841 (2014) (emphasizing indicia of litigation agency costs in 
merger class actions and arguing that the merits count for little in such 
claims); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and 
Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 137, 
155 (2011) (discussing merger lawsuits as “cookie-cutter complaints”); 
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An 
Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional 
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 907, 909 (2014) (“The 
debate over transactional class and derivative actions continues to rage 
both inside and outside academia.”). 
10. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). I filed 
an amicus curiae brief in the Trulia case. See Brief for Sean J. Griffith as 
Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. 
Ch. 2016) (No. 100020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945. 
11. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 886–87. 
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But the story did not end there. It is not so easy to halt the process of 
creative destruction. Trulia only spurred the disclosure bar to further 
innovation. 
This Article treats Trulia as a beginning, rather than an end. It 
shows that the case has spurred the disclosure bar to innovate in order 
to protect their fees. These innovations have taken the form of both 
process innovations and product innovations. The disclosure bar’s first 
step after Trulia was to seek an alternative forum, bringing disclosure 
claims in states other than Delaware and in federal courts.12 This is a 
process innovation. Soon, however, the disclosure bar began to change 
the nature of the claims themselves—seeking “mootness fees” instead 
of “disclosure settlements” and ultimately widening the scope of 
possible disclosure-based claims.13 This is a product innovation, a 
change in the nature of the product itself. This Article examines both 
forms of innovation in shareholder suits post-Trulia. The consistent 
theme throughout is that so long as the holdup value of litigation 
exceeds the cost of bringing a lawsuit, meritless claims will persist as 
the disclosure bar innovates to its advantage. 
From this introduction, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I 
introduces the crisis in shareholder litigation created by the 
proliferation of disclosure-based claims and the response of the 
Delaware Court of Chancery in Trulia. Part II follows the movement 
of disclosure-based claims to other state courts in the wake of that case. 
Part III discusses the transformation of disclosure settlements into 
disclosure-based mootness fees. Part IV describes the further migration 
of disclosure claims into federal court and, once there, their mutation 
into alternative forms of disclosure-based claims.14 Part V analyzes why 
the defense bar has lagged behind the disclosure bar in innovation and 
suggests that the best way for defendants to solve the problem is by 
credibly committing not to pay the disclosure bar’s fees, ultimately 
arguing that the proliferation of meritless, disclosure-based claims will 
end only when the holdup value of such claims is lower than the cost 
of pursuing them. 
 
12. Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 Vand. 
L. Rev. 603, 608, 615 (2018).  
13. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (distinguishing the settlement path from the 
mootness path). 
14. I was involved in many of the cases I discuss in Parts I–IV, either as an 
expert, an amicus, or an objector. I received no financial compensation 
from any of these cases and participated only to provide courts with 
information that they might otherwise not receive, given the non-
adversarial nature of settlement hearings. See infra note 21 and 
accompanying text. Nevertheless, I have disclosed any such involvement 
in the footnotes herein. 
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I. Trulia Triggers Innovation 
The crisis in shareholder litigation that began in 2009 was evident 
not only in the frequency with which merger claims were brought but 
also in the way in which those claims were typically resolved.15 Merger 
litigation was brought in almost every deal, and most merger claims 
settled.16 However, the vast majority of these settlements provided no 
monetary recovery to the plaintiff class.17 Instead, merger claims 
typically resulted in supplemental disclosures—so called, “disclosure 
settlements”—that became the basis of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee 
award.18 Defense attorneys insisted that the release bind all shareholders 
as a class and that it contain a broad release of any and all related 
claims.19  
Because these claims were settled on a class basis, courts had to 
approve the fairness of the settlement.20 At fairness hearings, judges are  
15. Dan Awrey et al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A 
Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 Yale 
J. Reg. 1, 12 (2018) (“[T]he core problem is that merger litigation . . . has 
devolved into a non-adversarial process in which attorneys on both 
sides . . . extract rents from corporations and their shareholders”). 
16. Approximately 70 percent of merger cases settle, while the rest are 
dismissed. Cornerstone Research in Cooperation with Robert 
Daines, Recent Developments in Shareholder Litigation 
Involving Mergers and Acquisitions 8 (2012), http://www. 
cornerstone.com/files/upload/Shareholder_MandA_Litigation.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/3932-WHGT] [hereinafter Developments in Shareholder 
Litigation] (finding that 69 percent of the 565 suits for which the authors 
could track the resolution resulted in settlement, while 27 percent were 
voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs, and 4 percent were dismissed with 
prejudice); Cain & Solomon, supra note 6, at 477 (“[L]itigation with 
respect to transactions is dismissed by the court 28.4% of the time. The 
other 71.6% of transaction litigations result in some type of settlement.”). 
17. Developments in Shareholder Litigation, supra note 16, at 10 
(reporting that less than 5 percent out of 190 settlements sampled resulted 
in payments to shareholders, while 82 percent resulted in disclosure-based 
settlements); Cain & Solomon, supra note 6, at 478 (“Settlements which 
only require disclosure constitute 55.1% of the settlement types in the 
sample and are the most common type of settlement.”). 
18. Griffith, supra note 9, at 15. Claims were brought merely to conclude 
settlements which were valuable solely as a basis for fees. Claims were 
brought merely to conclude settlements which were valuable solely as a 
basis for fees. 
19. Id. at 16–18. 
20. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 951, 968–69 (2014) (“What binds the class is not 
the agreement between the defendant and the lead plaintiffs or class 
counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that agreement. The 
binding effect of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood 
as a function of judicial power.”); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness 
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ordinarily uninformed about the low value of the settlement disclosures, 
and the former adversaries work together to keep them that way so 
that they will approve their settlement agreement.21 However, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery had seen enough such cases to worry that 
meaningful shareholder rights were imperiled by such practices.22 By 
 
Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 
1435, 1444 (2006) (“If class action attorneys sell out their clients, the 
judge should perceive that the settlement does not live up to the value of 
the claims and reject it accordingly. Conversely, if class action attorneys 
file a frivolous case, the judge should perceive that the settlement is 
merely a nuisance payment, reject it for that reason, and dismiss the 
case.”). 
21. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1082 
(1984) (“The contending parties have struck a bargain and have every 
interest in defending the settlement and in convincing the judge that it is 
in accord with the law.”). Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: 
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1, 46 (1991) (describing settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly 
orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”). 
22. See, e.g., In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 6350-VCL, 
slip op. at 2, 95 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2014) (settling claim for a $91.3 million 
payment to the stockholder class in spite of having been first presented 
as a disclosure settlement). Delaware judges rejected disclosure 
settlements sua sponte in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re Transatlantic 
Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, slip op. at 8–11 (Del. Ch. 
Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to approve settlement for lack of “any real 
investigation,” disclosure of additional background information and in 
light of the overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction); In re Medicis 
Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, slip op. at 24 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
4, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “giving out 
releases lightly . . . is something we’ve got to be careful about”); Rubin v. 
Obagi Med. Prods., Inc., No. 8433-VCL, slip op. at 8, 10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
30, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “there are 
unknown unknowns in the world, and the type of global release . . . in 
this case and . . . [similar] disclosure settlements provides expansive 
protection for the defendants against a broad range of claims, virtually all 
of which have been completely unexplored by plaintiffs”); In re 
Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 8790-VCL, slip op. at 69–70 
(Del. Ch. May 23, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that 
“when a fiduciary action settles, I have to have some confidence that the 
issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly when there is 
going to be a global, expansive, all-encompassing release given.”); Acevedo 
v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730–VCL, slip op. at 73, 79 (Del. Ch. 
July 8, 2015) (rejecting a disclosure-only settlement where plaintiffs 
settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive disclosures that routinely 
show up in these types of settlements”); In re Aruba Networks, Inc. 
Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015) 
(denying settlement approval and emphasizing that representation is 
inadequate where counsel files litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file 
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the end of 2015, that court had made it clear that it was considering 
change.23 In January 2016, change finally came with Trulia. 
In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard reaffirmed longstanding Delaware 
precedent that a supplemental disclosure offered in settlement is an 
adequate basis for a fee award only if it provides a material benefit to 
the shareholder class.24 In Delaware, as in federal law, information is 
material only “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”25 Lest 
there be any doubt that Delaware judges would no longer rubber stamp 
disclosure settlements, the Chancellor wrote: 
[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely 
to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the 
supplemental disclosures address a plainly material 
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the 
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing 
more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning 
the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have been 
investigated sufficiently. In using the term “plainly material,” I 
mean that it should not be a close call that the supplemental 
information is material as that term is defined under Delaware 
law.26 
In applying a high standard of materiality as a condition for the 
approval of disclosure settlements, Trulia announced that such 
settlements would no longer be welcome in Delaware. The disclosure 
bar would have to take their meritless settlements somewhere else. And 
so they did. 
 
in the first place” but subsequently fails to aggressively litigate when 
discovery turns up valuable information). 
23. See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving 
settlement but noting that “[i]f it were not for the reasonable reliance of 
the parties on formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of 
the Class might merit rejection of a settlement encompassing a release 
that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved”). 
24. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 22, 2016) (citing Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1964), 
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965)); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223 
A.2d 384 (Del. 1966). 
25. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting 
standard of TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Said 
differently, information is material if, from the perspective of a reasonable 
stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it “significantly alter[s] 
the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. 
Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994). 
26. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (citation omitted). 
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II. Process Innovation: Merger Claims in Other 
States 
Merger claims can be brought in three places: in the state of 
incorporation, in the headquarters state, or in federal court.27 When a 
company’s headquarters state is different from its state of 
incorporation, as is almost always the case for companies incorporated 
in Delaware, the complaint can be heard in up to three different courts. 
An early process innovation in the wake of Trulia was, therefore, to 
bring the claim and seek approval of the settlement in an alternative 
forum. This was an incremental innovation. A willingness to file merger 
claims outside of Delaware preceded Trulia.28 Nevertheless, the Court 
of Chancery’s apparent hostility to disclosure settlements led to a flood 
of merger litigation in other states after Trulia.29 
An obvious question raised by merger claims brought in other states 
is whether Trulia applies outside of Delaware, either as controlling or 
persuasive authority. The answer to this question, in turn, feeds into 
the litigants’ potential obligation to disclose Trulia to the court in the 
alternative forum. Both of these questions are analyzed below. 
A. The Extraterritoriality of Trulia 
Whether Trulia applies to settlements outside of Delaware depends 
first upon whether the target company is incorporated in Delaware. If 
so, Delaware law is controlling authority for substantive issues, but the 
law of the forum controls for procedural issues.30 But is Trulia 
substantive or procedural? 
 
27. The substantive law of the state of incorporation will govern wherever the 
dispute is litigated (except insofar as federal securities claims are raised, 
to which substantive federal law applies). See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 
U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (noting that state law governs “matters peculiar to 
the relationships among or between the corporation and its current 
officers, directors and shareholders”). The relevant federal venue would 
be a district court in either the state of incorporation or the headquarters 
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011). 
28. See generally John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 Ind. L. 
J. 1345 (2012) (noting increase in post-Trulia merger claim filings outside 
of Delaware); John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. 
Empirical Legal Stud. 605 (2012) (same); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra 
D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 Vand. L. 
Rev. 1053 (2013) (same). 
29. Cain et al., supra note 12, at 621 tbl.1 (2018) (finding merger filings in 
other states jumped in the first year after Trulia only to be overtaken the 
following year by filings in federal court). 
30. Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 467, 494 (2014). 
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When Delaware companies settle merger litigation in other states, 
the rules governing the approval of settlements are procedural and, 
therefore, subject to the law of the forum.31 But, in the class action 
context at least, the applicable standard is consistent across 
jurisdictions.32 The court, as a fiduciary of the class, asks whether the 
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”33 Courts may consider 
an array of factors in this analysis, but a crucial factor in all such 
analyses is the value received by the plaintiff class in the settlement.34 
In the context of a disclosure settlement, that means courts must weigh 
the value of the disclosures.35 That much is procedural.36 
But what standard applies in analyzing the value of the disclosures? 
Delaware provides a substantive answer to this question, and that 
answer under Trulia is “plainly material.”37 Some courts have therefore 
followed the internal affairs doctrine in applying Delaware’s “plainly 
material” standard to disclosure settlements in spite of an alternative 
standard (such as “useful” or “helpful”) under the law of the forum.38 
Courts do not always see it this way, however, and in other cases have 
insisted upon their own substantive law in determining the value of 
supplemental disclosures, notwithstanding Trulia.39 
Alternatively, if the company is not incorporated in Delaware (or 
if the standard for approving settlement is deemed to be procedural), 
Trulia may still apply as persuasive authority. In such settings, Trulia 
constitutes important persuasive authority because no jurisdiction sees  
31. Id.  
32. See Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 1468 & n.155. 
33. 4 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions § 
11:41 (4th ed. 2002). Most state rules in this context—like Delaware Court 
of Chancery Rule 23—mirror Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See, 
e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, The Persistent Problem of Multi-Forum Shareholder 
Litigation: A Proposed Statutory Response to Reshuffle the Deck, 10 Va. L. 
& Bus. Rev. 413, 429 (2016). 
34. See Conte & Newberg, supra note 33. 
35. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 n.46 (Del. Ch. 
Jan. 22, 2016). 
36. Id. at 898 & n.45. 
37. Id. at 898. 
38. See Order & Statement of Reasons at 6, Vergiev v. Aguero, UNN-L-2276-
15 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (rejecting settlement and 
adopting Trulia into New Jersey law). I was the shareholder objector in 
Vergiev. 
39. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2017) (applying New York law to evaluate the settlement involving a 
Delaware corporation sued in New York court, refusing to apply Trulia, 
and ultimately arriving at a significantly more deferential standard than 
Delaware). I was an expert for the objector in Gordon. 
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as much corporate law litigation as Delaware. As a result, state courts 
have adopted Trulia into their law in spite of the fact that the 
underlying litigation did not involve a Delaware company.40 
B. The Obligation to Disclose Trulia as Precedent in Disclosure-Based 
Settlements 
A gating issue for all of these analyses is whether the court in the 
settlement forum is aware of Trulia at all. Like a tree falling silently in 
the woods, Trulia cannot inform the decision of a court that has not 
been made aware of it. And there are plenty of reasons to suppose that 
courts are left unaware. 
Courts are unlikely to come upon knowledge of Trulia on their own. 
It would be surprising if busy state court judges whose dockets do not 
principally consist of corporate law cases kept close tabs on 
developments in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Instead, courts in 
other states rely on the adversarial system and, thus, the briefing of the 
parties before them for information concerning the relevant legal 
standards. 
At settlement, however, there is no adversarial process. The 
litigants have joined hands to defend their settlement agreement and 
have no interest in subjecting it to serious judicial scrutiny.41 As a 
result, neither side has any incentive to raise Trulia to the judge, either 
in the briefing or in the settlement hearing itself.42 
Even if the settlement proponents have no interest in raising Trulia, 
they may have an obligation to do so. The rules of professional conduct 
may obligate counsel under some circumstances to disclose authority 
contrary to their position even if that authority is not raised by 
opposing counsel. For example, ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) states that 
“[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal 
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be 
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel . . . .”43 Trulia, in its open hostility to disclosure 
settlements and in its announcement of a “plainly material” standard 
 
40. See, e.g., Bushansky v. All. Fiber Optics Prods., Inc., No. 16-CV-294245, 
slip op. at 7–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017) (adopting Trulia standard 
into California law); Griffith v. Quality Distrib., Inc., No. 2D17-3160, slip 
op. at 13–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018) (adopting Trulia standard 
into Florida law). I was the shareholder objector in Quality. 
41. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to Objection by Lawrence B. Dvores to 
Plaintiff’s Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Stein v. Symetra 
Fin. Corp., No. 15-2-20458-1SEA at 3 n.1 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 10, 
2016) (citing Delaware authority for approval of disclosure-based fees and 
discussing the benefits of settlement without mentioning Trulia). 
43. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2018). 
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for supplemental disclosures, would seem to be adverse to the position 
of both proponents to a disclosure settlement. And, following the logic 
above, if Delaware law controls with regard to the materiality 
determination, Trulia should count as “authority in the controlling 
jurisdiction.”44 Thus, at least when the settlement involves a Delaware-
incorporated company, Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) might impose an ethical 
obligation to disclose Trulia to the court. 
It is more difficult to read Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) to compel disclosure 
when Trulia is persuasive, but not controlling, authority. However, in 
such cases, the ethics rules may compel disclosure by another route. 
After Trulia, plaintiffs often cited pre-2016 Delaware precedent 
approving disclosure settlements as support for disclosure-based 
settlements or fees sought in other jurisdictions, while nevertheless 
remaining conspicuously silent on Trulia.45 This is a plainly material 
omission. Citing Delaware precedent in favor of settlement without 
citing Trulia is akin to perpetuating fraud upon the court. Under Model 
Rule 3.3(a)(1), any party making a false statement to a tribunal has a 
duty to correct it.46 A statement to the effect that “Delaware law 
supports disclosure-based settlements like this one” may thus trigger a 
duty to correct. The ethics rules thus prevent settlement proponents 
from cherry-picking older Delaware case law supporting broad releases 
and large fees without also informing the court of Delaware’s more 
recent rulings, most notably Trulia. 
In sum, the disclosure bar could not necessarily avoid Trulia by 
taking their settlements to another state. As long as their fees depend 
upon a class settlement, they necessarily face a fairness hearing. This 
puts them in the position of being compelled to disclose Trulia to other 
courts, which might decide to follow it. This left them vulnerable to 
shareholder objections to settlement.47 These constraints led to further 
innovation. First, to avoid the risk of settlement hearings, the disclosure 
bar converted their disclosure settlements into mootness fee awards. 
Second, to avoid Trulia, the disclosure bar changed the legal basis of 
their disclosure claims from Delaware law to section 14A of the federal 
proxy rules. Each of these innovations is discussed below.48  
44. Id. 
45. Anthony Rickey & Keola R. Whittaker, Will Trulia Drive “Merger Tax” 
Suits out of Delaware?, Wash. Legal Found. (Apr. 29, 2016), https:// 
www.wlf.org/2016/04/29/publishing/will-trulia-drive-merger-tax-suits-out-
of-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/MW9K-SZ9F] (compiling cases in which 
plaintiffs in alternative jurisdictions failed to cite recent Delaware case 
law viewing disclosure-based settlements with disfavor). 
46. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2018). 
47. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure 
Settlements: A “How To” Guide, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 281, 302 (2017). 
48. See infra Parts III & IV. 
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III. Product Innovation: Mootness Settlements 
As an alternative to settlement, a plaintiff with a disclosure-based 
claim can simply insist that the defendant make additional disclosures 
and, when they do, claim victory and fees on that basis.49 In this 
situation, there is no fairness hearing because there is no settlement. 
Instead, the plaintiffs’ lawyers voluntarily dismiss their claim as moot 
on account of the defendant’s corrective disclosures, but not without 
asserting a right to fees based on the benefit they created by bringing 
the disclosures to the defendant’s attention.50 The right to fees can be 
fought over by the parties and, if the plaintiff is successful, awarded by 
the court, i.e. a “mootness award.”51 Often, however, they are simply 
agreed upon by the parties, i.e. a “mootness settlement.”52 
The mootness innovation enables the settlement proponents to 
avoid the risk of a fairness hearing. Without a class settlement, there is 
no release of claims, and no res judicata effect on non-party 
shareholders who would otherwise be members of the class.53 Thus,  
49. Griffith & Rickey, supra note 47, at 290. 
50. Griffith & Rickey, supra note 47, at 284. Mootness fee cases are an 
offshoot of the basic corporate benefit doctrine. As explained by the 
Delaware Supreme Court: 
Under the “mootness” exception, a court may award attorneys’ 
fees where the fee applicant demonstrates that: (1) the litigation 
was meritorious when filed, (2) the action rendering the litigation 
moot produced the same or a similar benefit sought by the 
litigation, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the 
litigation and the action taken producing the benefit. 
 Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d 
1084, 1092 (Del. 2006) (accepting the further characterization of “the 
mootness doctrine [as] an extension of the corporate benefit exception”). 
51. See, e.g., In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d 
353, 357 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1999) (noting that “uncertainty over the 
nature of the ‘benefit’ and its relation to the litigation may be expected 
to occur primarily in moot cases. Where a case has been litigated to a 
conclusion or settled, the nature of the ‘benefit’ and its causal connection 
to the litigation is ordinarily clear”). The mootness award was cited by 
the Court of Chancery as the “preferred method” for resolving disclosure-
based claims because of the potential for adversarial fee litigation to 
enable the court to value the benefit on an informed basis. In re Trulia, 
Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 896–97 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016). 
Unfortunately, parties have tended to settle in order to avoid this 
additional layer of adversarial process. See Cain et al., supra note 12, at 
629, 633 (finding sharply increasing rates of mootness settlements in the 
wake of Trulia). 
52. See Cain et al., supra note 12, at 629, 633.  
53. See, e.g., In re Advanced Mammography Servs., Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 
14831, 1996 WL 633409, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1996) (denying res 
judicata effect to mootness dismissals because “to release claims that have 
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insofar as the principal policy concern behind the curtailment of 
disclosure settlements was the potential waiver of valid claims, 
mootness fees raise no such concerns.54 But any hope that a move 
toward mootness fees would result in the reinsertion of the adversarial 
element through the contestation of fees has so far not been realized.55 
After a small number of fee proceedings in the wake of Trulia, the 
pattern seems to have moved towards mootness settlements rather than 
mootness awards.56 At most, mootness settlements require shareholder 
notification, not judicial review.57 
How much do plaintiffs’ lawyers get for mootness fees? Early cases 
in Delaware suggested mootness cases might be worth considerably less 
than disclosure settlements.58 However, studies suggest that mootness 
 
never been advanced, that in some instances may belong to other entities 
that comprise the class (derivative claims), in which there appears to be 
no serious discovery record in any event, and most importantly, in 
exchange for no consideration”). 
54. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
55. This hope was expressed in Trulia itself. The court noted that: 
[In the mootness context,] where securing a release is not at issue, 
defendants are incentivized to oppose fee requests they view as 
excessive. Hence, the adversarial process would remain in place 
and assist the Court in its evaluation of the nature of the benefit 
conferred (i.e., the value of the supplemental disclosures) for 
purposes of determining the reasonableness of the requested fee. 
 In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (citations omitted). 
56. See infra note 57. Mootness fees have also often been sought in 
jurisdictions other than Delaware, thereby avoiding the additional 
procedural protections provided by Delaware law. Id. 
57. See, e.g., Swomley v. Schlecht, No. 9355-VCL, 2015 WL 1186126, at *1–
2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2015) (setting forth a class notice procedure for 
mootness fees, after defendants mooted certain disclosure claims and 
successfully moved to dismiss rest of case); In re Zalicus, Inc. Stockholders 
Litig., No. 9602-CB, 2015 WL 226109, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 2015) 
(supporting a private mootness fee resolution procedure while requiring 
that adequate notice be provided to stockholders); In re Astex Pharm., 
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 8917-VCL, 2014 WL 4180342, at *1–2 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 25, 2014) (same). 
58. See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL 
4146425, at *3, 5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (finding disclosures in mootness 
in a mootness settlement to be merely “helpful,” not “material,” but 
nevertheless awarding $50,000 in attorneys’ fees); see also Stipulated 
Order Regarding Court-Ordered Notice and Closing the Action at 1, In 
re PMFG Stockholder Litig., No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017) 
(mootness settlement for $75,000 in attorneys’ fees following plaintiff’s 
notice of intent to object to disclosure settlement); Order Granting 
Plaintiffs’ Petition for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 3, In 
re Baker Hughes Inc. Stockholders Litig. Consol., No. 10390-CB (Del. Ch. 
June 17, 2016) (mootness award of $100,000 in attorneys’ fees in merger 
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settlements have generally risen into the low- to mid- six figures, not 
far from the going rate for disclosure settlements.59 Consistent with 
these studies, data uncovered in response to a sua sponte request from 
the bench in a recent federal case shows that mootness fees agreed upon 
in federal district court and in Delaware Court of Chancery cases 
between January 2016 and September 2018 range from $87,500 to 
$450,000, with an average of $268,750.60 
It is notable that plaintiffs’ attorneys are achieving these fees 
without a release to shareholders not named in the compliant. In other 
words, other shareholders could bring suit for essentially the same cause 
of action in the underlying complaint. How likely is this? Not very. 
First, with respect to claims alleging deficiencies of process and price, 
the substantive law renders damages claims essentially unwinnable once 
shareholders have voted to approve the transaction.61 Second, once the 
vote occurs and the transaction closes, there is no longer any potential 
for injunctive relief either.62 As a practical matter, this is why litigants 
settle mootness claims close in time to the closing of the merger. By 
doing so, they prevent other shareholder plaintiffs from filing similar 
disclosure-based claims. Third, the best opportunity to identify 
deficiencies of disclosure also passes with the shareholder vote.63 After 
the vote, it will no longer be possible to settle for supplemental 
disclosures, or other forms of non-monetary relief.64 Instead, claimants 
will be forced to sue for damages claiming that materially deficient 
disclosures caused the approval of a transaction that should never have 
occurred.65 Although such claims may exist, they will be vanishingly 
 
case); Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Application for an Award of Attorneys’ 
Fees and Expenses at 1, In re Receptos, Inc. Stockholder Litig. Consol., 
No. 11316-CB (Del. Ch. July 27, 2016) (mootness award of $100,000 in 
attorneys’ fees in merger case). 
59. Cain et al., supra note 12, at 625 tbl.3 (finding median of $265,000 for 
mootness settlements compared to median of $300,000 for disclosure 
settlements in 2017); see also Anthony Rickey, Absent Reform, Little 
Relief in Sight from Chronic “Merger Tax” Class-Action Litigation, 32 
Wash. Legal Found. 4 fig.1 (Aug. 25, 2017) (compiling post-Trulia 
mootness fee cases). 
60. See Defendant’s Response to Order Ex. 1 at 4–9, Einhorn v. Kindred 
Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-00297-RGA (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2018). 
61. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015); 
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014). 
62. See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312. 
63. See Kahn, 88 A.3d at 644. 
64. See id. 
65. See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312–14.  
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rare.66 This suggests that the breadth of the release that came with 
disclosure settlements may not have been such an important component 
of settlement after all.67 But if this is so, it also suggests that the real 
value of a merger claim, whether it ends in mootness or settlement, lies 
in its hold-up value prior to the shareholder vote. 
In sum, innovative lawyers found a way to make mootness 
settlements an effective substitute for disclosures settlements. Defense 
lawyers get nearly the same protection from concluding a mootness 
settlement as they achieve in a disclosure settlement. And plaintiffs’ 
lawyers are well compensated either way. 
IV. Process and Product Innovation Combined: 
Federal Court Filings and the Alt-Disclosure Claim 
Yet another option for avoiding Trulia, and the risk that courts in 
other states might follow it, is to file the merger claim in federal court 
instead. Claims that would otherwise be disclosure-based merger cases 
in state court can also be brought within the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the federal courts by pleading violations of section 14A of the federal 
proxy rules. The 14A innovation led not only to a route around Trulia 
but also, eventually, to a world of new claims that could be settled for 
supplemental disclosures and fees. 
A. Merger Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws 
If state corporate law is principally focused on shareholders and 
managers, federal securities law is principally focused on investors and 
issuers.68 Because of the substantial overlap between investors and 
shareholders, on the one hand, and corporate issuers and boards of 
directors, on the other, there is considerable overlap in coverage 
between the two regimes. The securities laws give the federal 
government power to regulate what might otherwise be viewed as core 
corporate governance functions—functions previously governed solely 
by state law. For example, in the merger context, the federal securities 
laws now prescribe tender offer procedures and the form and content of 
 
66. See id. at 312. The Bank of America/Merrill Lynch proxy fraud case that 
resulted in a $2.43 billion settlement is perhaps the best example. See 
Peter J. Henning & Steven Davidoff Solomon, For Bank of America, More 
Trouble from Merrill Lynch Merger, N.Y. Times DealBook (Sept. 28, 
2012, 1:31 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/the-cost-of-
putting-the-merrill-lynch-merger-behind-it/ [https://perma.cc/M2XZ-JX4N]. 
67. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text. 
68. The two principal securities laws for our purposes here are the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2012), and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).  
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disclosures provided in connection with shareholder voting.69 Rules 
promulgated by the SEC regulate proxy disclosures.70 Most notably, 
Rule 14a-9 proscribes the solicitation of proxies by means of a 
materially false or misleading proxy statement.71 The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that investors have a private right of action to enforce 
Rule 14a-9.72 
In the merger context, Rule 14a-9 claims allege that the target 
company did not fully and fairly disclose all material information in the 
merger proxy—essentially the same allegations underlying state law 
fiduciary duty claims.73 Additional state law claims, such as Revlon 
claims alleging defects in the merger process or price,74 can be appended 
to the 14a-9 claims and brought in federal court.75 Alternatively, 
plaintiffs may simply file the 14a-9 claim and seek a disclosure or 
mootness settlement in federal court.76 In either case, section 27 of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 guarantees that the 14a-9 claim cannot 
be removed to state court.77 
 
69. See Securities Exchange Act § 78n-1. 
70. Rule 14a-3, for example, specifies the information that must be furnished 
to voting security holders by cross-referencing detailed disclosure forms. 
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2018) (cross-referencing Schedule 14A and 
Forms S-4 and F-4); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A (2018) 
(setting forth information required in proxy statement). 
71. The rule states that: 
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means 
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other 
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which, 
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it 
is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, 
or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to 
make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary 
to correct any statement in any earlier communication with 
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or 
subject matter which has become false or misleading. 
 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2018). 
72. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–32 (1964). 
73. See id. at 431–32. 
74. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
75. See, e.g., Brown v. Brewer, No. CV 06-3731-GHK (SHx), 2010 WL 
2472182 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010).  
76. See Borak, 377 U.S. at 430–31.  
77. Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that federal 
courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction” over “violations of [the Act] or 
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions 
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Within a year of Trulia, state law merger claims had converted 
almost entirely to federal law merger claims.78 There is good reason for 
this. Both before and after Trulia, many federal courts had shown 
themselves to be receptive to disclosure-based settlements.79 But, this 
strategy does not always work. In In Re: Walgreen Co. Stockholder 
Litigation,80 Judge Posner reversed a district court decision approving 
a disclosure settlement in the Walgreen-Boots merger.81 In holding that 
the settlement should have been rejected because the disclosures 
provided no benefit to the plaintiff class, Judge Posner expressly 
endorsed the Trulia opinion and the “plainly material” standard.82 He 
concluded that the district court on remand should “give serious 
consideration to either appointing new class counsel, or dismissing the 
suit.”83 As a result, Trulia via Walgreen now applies in the Seventh 
Circuit and, going forward, settlement proponents in that circuit have 
an obligation under Rule 3.3(a)(2) to raise Trulia at the settlement 
hearing.84 
 
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Act] or the 
rules and regulations thereunder.” 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012). 
78. Stephan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in 
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2017 Full-Year Review 5–6 
(25th ed. 2018); see also Cain et al., supra note 12, tbls.1 & 5 (showing 
an increase in the percentage of cases filed in federal courts). 
79. Typical disclosure settlements recently approved by federal courts include 
Taxman v. Covidien PLC, 1:14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2015), 
ECF No. 78; Leitz v. Kraft Foods Group, Inc., 3:15-CV-262-HEH, 2016 
WL 1043021 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2016); McGill v. Hake, 1:15-cv-00217-
TWP-DKL (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2016), ECF No. 54; Li v. Bowers, 1:15-cv-
00373-LCB-LPA (M.D. N.C. Mar. 22, 2016), ECF No. 26; In re 
Meadowbrook Ins. Grp., Inc., 5:15-cv-10057-JCO-MJH (E.D. Mich. Apr. 
7, 2016). I was involved in Covidien as an expert for the objector but had 
no role in the other cases. 
80. 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016). 
81. Id.  
82. Id. at 725. 
83. Id. at 726. 
84. Even when a jurisdiction adopts the Trulia standard, the non-adversarial 
nature of the settlement process can lead to striking omissions. For 
example, after Walgreen, one plaintiff filed papers in support of a 
disclosure settlement with a single citation to the Seventh Circuit’s recent 
decision, for the proposition that “the trial judge should ask whether the 
[supplemental disclosures] would be likely to matter to a reasonable 
investor.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final 
Approval of Class Action Settlement, Class Certification, and Application 
for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses at 12, Bushansky v. Remy 
Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (No. 1:15-cv-01385-TWP-
TAB) (emphasis added) (quoting Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724). In spite of 
being filed in a district court (Indiana) within the Seventh Circuit, there 
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As a result of Walgreen, federal cases have now largely converted 
to mootness settlements rather than disclosure settlements, mirroring 
early patterns in state courts after Trulia.85 This is, of course, another 
example of innovation. In response to Trulia at the state level, plaintiffs 
brought their cases in federal court, and in response to Walgreen at the 
federal level, plaintiffs converted them into mootness dismissals. The 
most significant innovation, however, may prove to be the 
transformation of merger claims into something else entirely. 
B. Alternative Disclosure Claims Under Federal Law 
The federal proxy rules do not mandate disclosure concerning 
mergers alone. The proxy rules require detailed disclosure of a number 
of items, including the prior experience and compensation of directors 
and officers,86 details of fees paid to the company’s independent public 
accountants,87 and details concerning stock-based compensation plans.88 
Any one of these areas presents a potential for disclosure-based 
litigation under the federal proxy rules. 
In another example of destructive innovation, 14A disclosure claims 
have begun to mutate from merger cases into these other forms. For 
example, one alternative disclosure-based claim under 14A alleges that 
a proposed proxy statement violates the proxy rules by failing to 
disclose details purportedly required by Item 10(a), such as the number 
of persons in each class of participants in a stock incentive plan.89 The 
complaint seeks an injunction to prevent the vote or, alternatively, 
supplemental disclosures to prevent the vote from being uninformed.90 
Defendants can fight the injunction or make the disclosures and pay a 
fee to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Such alternative disclosure claims have 
proliferated in the post-Trulia environment as frequent-filer plaintiffs 
 
was no mention of the “plainly material” standard or Trulia’s other 
requirements, let alone Judge Posner’s striking description of disclosure 
settlements as “no better than a racket” that “must end.” Walgreen, 832 
F.3d at 724. I appeared as an objector to this settlement. Following 
adversarial argument over the value of the disclosures, the district court 
refused to approve the settlement. See Bushansky, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 754.  
85. See Cain et al., supra note 12, at 483 tbl.V.A. 
86. 17 C.F.R. § 14a-101 (2018). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. See, e.g., Complaint at 4–6, Stein v. Gibraltar Indus., Inc., No. 1:18-cv-
01893-CBA-SMG (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018), ECF No. 80. 
90. Id. at 1 (seeking “an injunction to prevent a vote by its shareholders on 
Management Proposal 3 in the 2018 Proxy Statement . . . . The grounds 
for this injunction are Defendant’s failures to comply with the SEC’s 
disclosure requirements for proxy statements”). 
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shift their targets from mergers to a wider array of allegedly improper 
proxy disclosures.  
The settlement dynamics of these alt-disclosure cases closely 
resemble merger claims. Plaintiffs file disclosure-based claims, which 
defendants moot by making supplemental disclosures shortly before the 
shareholder vote, after which the plaintiffs and defendants negotiate a 
fee. As a result, defendants eliminate the threat of an injunction, thus 
obtaining essentially the same benefit as a disclosure settlement, and 
avoid the cost of litigating the size of the plaintiffs’ mootness fee.91 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers get six-figure fees that may, on average, be somewhat 
smaller than their fees in disclosure settlements. On a per-hour basis, 
however, their recoveries may be just as good.92 And the discovery of 
new sources of disclosure-based claims may enable the disclosure bar to 
maintain overall revenue levels, in spite of accepting slightly lower fees 
on a per-claim basis. At the end of the day, however, the extent to 
which the disclosure bar profits from such cases is difficult to measure 
because the notices of dismissal often do not disclose whether fees have 
been paid and, if so, in what amount.93 
The common elements uniting proxy and merger claims are the 
ability to settle for disclosures and the hold-up value of enjoining the 
vote. The risk that the vote might be enjoined is enough to justify 
making the requested disclosures, even if they are very likely 
immaterial. And, once the disclosures have been made, the cost of 
disputing fees in adversarial proceedings may be greater than simply 
agreeing to a mootness settlement.94 The basic business strategy of the 
disclosure bar, in other words, is the monetization of two hold-up 
problems: the hold-up value of potentially enjoining the vote and the 
 
91. This is roughly the same benefit as a disclosure settlement because the 
passing of the vote, not the settlement itself, eliminates the threat of 
injunction. Because there is no preclusive settlement, the defendant 
remains exposed to a very low probability of threat of a subsequent 
damages claim for fraud in the proxy, as in the Bank of America/Merrill 
Lynch merger. See Henning & Solomon, supra note 66. But such cases are 
unicorns. Were a case as strong as the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch 
proxy fraud case to present itself after a disclosure settlement, it is by no 
means clear that the judge in the subsequent case would view herself as 
precluded by the prior settlement. See supra notes 66–67 and 
accompanying text. 
92. See, e.g., Stein v. Acuity Brands, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-06945-NGG-RER, at 
2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018), ECF No. 15 (requesting a $300,000 mootness 
fee for 7.7 hours of work); Stein v. Rusnack, No. 1:16-cv-02487-KPF 
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 28, 2017), ECF No. 35 (receiving a fee award of $560,000 
based on a lodestar of less than half that amount). 
93. See, e.g., Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Gibraltar Indus., Inc., No. 1:18-
cv-01893-CBA-SMG. 
94. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
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hold-up cost of fighting over the fee. Once the disclosure bar found their 
way into federal court under federal law, they innovated new ways to 
extract hold-up value using the proxy rules. 
V. Competitive Innovation 
But what about the defendants? So far, this Article has emphasized 
the relentless creativity of the disclosure bar. But what about the other 
side? How have corporate defendants adapted, responded, and 
innovated themselves? What can corporate defendants do to respond 
to the migration of disclosure-based litigation and the mutation of 
disclosure-based claims into new causes of action? 
It is worth observing, as an initial matter, that insofar as disclosure-
based claims have proliferated as securities class actions, something 
already has been done about it. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),95 which, among other 
things, bars fee awards for non-pecuniary relief in securities class 
actions.96 The PSLRA expressly provides that: “[t]otal attorney fees and 
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class” in 
securities class actions may “not exceed a reasonable percentage of the 
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the 
class.”97 Because no damages or prejudgment interest are paid to the 
class in a disclosure-based settlement, attorneys’ fees in such 
settlements must also be zero. Although some courts have rejected this 
interpretation of the statute, it is the only interpretation consistent 
with the statutory text.98 An alternative interpretation—that Congress 
intended only to limit attorneys’ fees to a reasonable percentage of 
damages when damages are paid, not to ban fee awards for non-
pecuniary relief—imports assumed meanings into otherwise 
unambiguous statutory text and is, in any event, unsupported by 
legislative history.99 Courts in other jurisdictions have read parallel 
 
95. Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737. 
96. George Coppolo, OLR Research Report, 2002-R-0695 Private 
Litigation Reform Act (2002). 
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018). 
98. Transcript of Settlement Conference at 48, Taxman v. Covidien P.L.C., 
No. 1:14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2015), ECF No. 80 (“[I]t is an 
awful lot of weight to read on that one sentence, that Congress rewrote 
the common benefit rule with respect to federal securities litigation in that 
sort of backhanded way, rather than directly . . . . I don’t read the 
language quite as powerfully as you do.”). I was an expert for the objector 
in Covidien. 
99. See generally H.R. Rep No. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (focusing on the 
total amount of fees awarded, not how those fees were calculated). 
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statutes to bar non-pecuniary relief in class action settlements.100 
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the clarity of the statutory text, federal 
courts have a history of disregarding the PSRLA.101 
Even if it were correctly interpreted and consistently applied, 
however, the PSLRA would not solve the problem of disclosure-based 
shareholder suits. The PSLRA provision quoted above bans fees only 
in connection with class action settlements. Mootness fees, now the 
most common litigation pattern in federal court, are apparently 
unaffected. Moreover, plaintiffs can evade other provisions of the 
PSLRA by filing on an individual rather than a class basis. For 
example, the PSLRA seeks to avoid the problem of “professional 
plaintiffs” by preventing any person from acting as a lead plaintiff in 
more than five securities class actions during a three-year period.102 But 
again, because this and other procedural protections of the PSLRA 
speak only to class actions, the protections can be avoided by filing on 
an individual rather than a class basis.103 In spite of claiming rights held 
by all shareholders and seeking relief that would benefit all 
stockholders, plaintiffs file individual actions without seeking class 
certification. This is another example of innovation from the plaintiffs’ 
disclosure bar. By careful pleading, they evade the PSLRA. 
But rather than waiting for Congress or the courts to clarify the 
PSRLA, corporate defendants may be able to adopt an innovative 
solution of their own to address the proliferation of meritless disclosure-
based litigation. As I have argued at length elsewhere, corporations can 
solve these problems through private ordering by enacting no-pay 
provisions.104 
A no-pay provision would commit the corporation, ex ante, to a 
policy of not paying attorneys’ fees and costs for a specified form of 
 
100. See Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. App. 2013) 
(interpreting a Texas statute to prohibit the payment of attorneys’ fees 
in a disclosure settlement). 
101. See generally M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial 
Noncompliance with Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. Legal Stud. S87 (2015) (noting 
judges’ general reluctance to impose sanctions for PSLRA violations). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2018) (allowing more than five lead 
plaintiff appointments only upon express approval of the court). 
103. See § 78u-4(a)(1). Other procedural protections of the PSLRA require 
plaintiffs to certify certain information regarding their shareholding at the 
time a complaint is filed, see § 78u-4(a)(2)(A), and to disclose any 
proposed settlement to other class members, § 78u-4(a)(7). 
104. Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No-Pay Provisions 
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t in The 
Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up? 
(Steven D. Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2019). 
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representative litigation.105 Such provisions could be broad (banning 
corporate payment of plaintiffs’ fees in shareholder litigation generally) 
or narrow (banning corporate payment of plaintiffs’ fees only for 
disclosure-based claims). In either case, no-pay provisions operate as an 
agreement among shareholders to opt-out of a default term of corporate 
law—the corporate benefit doctrine—that, although originally designed 
to benefit shareholders, instead has come to harm them.106 Such 
provisions operate essentially as a waiver of the right to recover 
attorneys’ fees from the corporation. The provision is consistent with 
both state and federal law.107 
Why then would corporations not adopt no-pay provisions?108 It 
may be that corporate defendants are less innovative than the 
 
105. For an example of such a provision consider: 
To the fullest extent permitted by law, in the event that any 
Claiming Party initiates or asserts any Claim or joins, offers 
substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial interest in any 
Claim against any Corporation Parties, then, regardless whether 
the Claiming Party is successful on its Claim in whole or in part, 
(i) the Claiming Party shall bear its own Litigation Costs, and (ii) 
the Claiming Party and the Claiming Party’s attorneys shall not 
be entitled to recover any Litigation Costs or, in a derivative or 
class action, to receive any fees or expenses as the result of the 
creation of any common fund, or from a corporate benefit 
purportedly conferred upon the corporation. 
 Bridgeline Digital, Inc., Amended and Restated By-laws (Form 10-Q, Ex. 
3.2) 20 (Feb. 17, 2015). 
106. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 40–41 (discussing the origin of the corporate 
benefit doctrine). 
107. No-pay provisions are unaffected by the Delaware General Corporation 
Law’s prohibition of fee shifting in bylaw and charter provisions. The 
statute bars efforts to “impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’ 
fees or expenses of the corporation.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(f) 
(2019). A no-pay provision does not impose liability on any stockholder 
for the fees and expenses of the corporation; it merely forces the 
stockholder to bear his or her own fees and costs. See id. § 109(b) (“The 
bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a 
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any 
other party in connection with an internal corporate claim . . . .”). With 
regard to federal law, there is no reason to suppose that the corporate 
benefit doctrine is an immutable rule. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 
396 U.S. 375, 390–97 (1970) (awarding attorneys’ fees in a § 14(a) claim 
resulting in non-pecuniary relief on the basis of the traditional “corporate 
benefit” doctrine). A No-Fee provision essentially contracts for the 
reading of the PSLRA advanced in this Article. 
108. It is worth noting that some have. Anthony Rickey & Benjamin P. 
Edwards, “No Pay” Bylaws May Threaten Shareholder Lawsuits, CLS 
Blue Sky Blog (Mar. 27, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/ 
2017/03/27/no-pay-bylaws-may-threaten-shareholder-lawsuits/#_ftn6 
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disclosure bar because the stakes are lower.109 Corporations, of course, 
would like to reduce the cost of non-meritorious disclosure-based claims, 
but, however wasteful such claims may be, they are a manageable cost 
and do not threaten the existence of the firm. By contrast, if the 
disclosure bar did not adapt to changes making disclosure claims harder 
to bring, they would go extinct.110 Necessity, it is often said, is the 
mother of invention, and this may go far in explaining the greater 
inventiveness of the disclosure bar compared to the corporate defense 
bar. 
Also, innovative corporate governance provisions likely increase 
litigation risk, at least among early adopters, and plaintiffs are 
especially primed to challenge provisions, such as no-pay provisions, 
that threaten to impact their livelihood. For example, plaintiffs 
challenged forum-selection bylaws at over a dozen companies, most of 
which repealed the bylaw rather than litigate the issue, before the 
provisions were finally upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.111 More recently, 
plaintiffs have been rewarded for knocking down fee-shifting bylaws112 
and federal forum-selection provisions.113 Early adopters of no-pay 
provisions are likewise open to challenges and, similar to early adopters 
of forum-selection provisions, likely to settle the cases by removing the 
provision (and paying attorneys’ fees). This is a Catch-22. Corporations 
can either incur significant litigation costs in order to prove the 
enforceability of a term designed to spare them wasteful litigation costs 
or they can settle for lower litigation costs but, also, eliminate the term. 
Most, unsurprisingly, have decided not to adopt the provision in the 
 
[https://perma.cc/4JE2-VXE2] (surveying EDGAR filings and finding 
few instances of no-pay adoptions). 
109. See Friedlander, supra note 8, at 885–89 (recounting the high monetary 
risks associated with disclosure litigation). 
110. At least they would cease to exist as the disclosure bar. It is possible, of 
course, that they could shift to specialize in a wholly different type of 
litigation. 
111. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). For more of the backstory on those claims, 
see Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate 
Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 Del. J. Corp. L. 
333, 346 n.61 (2012). 
112. Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
113. Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch. 
2018). 
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first place.114 Corporations need a test case—a Moran v. Household Int’l, 
Inc.,115 for no-pays—before they widely adopt the provision.116  
All of this suggests that the transaction costs of change in this area 
are not zero and are not symmetrical. The corporate benefit rule 
imposes obstacles to opting out.  It is, thus, a “sticky” default.117 Sticky 
defaults can enshrine inefficient rules, and corporate law scholars have 
argued that the best way to prevent this is to set corporate law default 
rules in favor of shareholders.118 In this case, however, the default rule 
would appear to be set in favor of the disclosure bar and the defense 
lawyers that generate fees from them. Because attorneys’ fees are paid 
with shareholders’ money, a pro-shareholder default rule would be a 
clear statutory provision or judicial ruling that blessed the adoption of 
no-pay provisions. 
Conclusion 
This Article has traced innovations in disclosure-based shareholder 
litigation following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinion in Trulia. 
It has found ample innovation on the plaintiffs’ side, starting with the 
migration of merger cases to other courts and their eventual mutation 
into other kinds of disclosure claims, first designed to avoid Trulia, then 
redesigned to evade Walgreen and the PSLRA. There has not been a 
parallel amount of innovation on the defense side. The best way to spur 
 
114. See Rickey & Edwards, supra note 108; Kevin M. LaCroix, More About 
Litigation Reform Bylaws: Will “No-Pay” Provisions Succeed Where 
Forum Selection Bylaws Have Failed?, The D&O Diary (Jan. 22, 2017), 
https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/01/articles/securities-laws/litigation- 
reform-bylaws-will-no-pay-provisions-succeed-forum-selection-bylaws-failed/ 
[https://perma.cc/2SEU-47MV]. 
115. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). See generally David Ronald Ellin, The Poison 
Pill Warrant—Apothecary and Antidote: Moran v. Household 
International, Inc., 36 DePaul L. Rev. 413 (1987) (describing the 
importance of the Moran court’s decision to uphold an anti-takeover 
device as an exercise of business judgment).  
116. See id. (holding that poison pills generally could not be challenged when 
adopted); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 
91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1985 (1991) (describing Moran as the test case 
for poison pills). 
117. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness 
of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. L. Rev. 651 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell, 
Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. Rev. 
383 (2007) (discussing implications of sticky default rules for corporate 
law theory). 
118. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for 
Corporate Law Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 492 (2002) 
(emphasizing difficulties associated with opting-out of pro-management 
terms given management’s power to control the voting generally and 
therefore advocating pro-shareholder default terms). 
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defense side innovation is to allow shareholders to agree to an 
arrangement ex ante that precludes the payment of attorneys’ fees for 
disclosure suits ex post. 
